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In his discussion of Habermas, Foucault, and rhetoric, Kendall Phillips aims to reconstruct a 
debate between Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault that never materialized.  The debate was 
to take Kant’s essay “What Is Enlightenment?” as its point of departure.  Given this starting 
point, one would expect the debate to turn on differing conceptions of public reason and the 
public sphere.  Phillips, however, identifies the notion of comprehensibility as the deeper point at 
issue.  Whereas Habermas predicates his discourse theory—and consequently, his normative 
model of undistorted communication in the public sphere—on the assumption of mutual 
comprehensibility among participants, Foucault’s “ontology of the present” aims to upset just 
this assumption.  Behind Foucault’s strategy lies the belief that enlightenment constitutes a 
never-completed process calling for ongoing, modest experiments in transgression that push the 
boundaries of established modes of thought and action.  Habermas’s normative model, by 
contrast, suggests the possibility of completion—an “enlightened age” that would be secured 
through a properly structured and comprehensible public sphere.  Phillips then goes on, finally, 
to propose rhetoric as the area in which one might find a way to mediate these two opposed 
conceptions. 
Although I find Phillips’ general characterizations of Habermas and Foucault plausible 
enough and am intrigued by his allusions to rhetoric, I’m not sure how much I agree with his 
diagnosis.  At the least, I would want to make some modifications in his analysis.  I do not deny 
that mutual comprehensibility is a potentially difficult matter that Habermas moves past rather 
quickly in his urge to elaborate norms of public justification.  Indeed, he no longer treats 
comprehensibility as a validity claim on a par with truth, rightness, and the like, but has demoted 
it to a “presupposition of communication” or idealization that language-users suppose is 
adequately satisfied when they engage in communicative action (Habermas 1984, 310; 1996, 11-
12).  Moreover, although I am much less familiar with Foucault, Phillips’s reading strikes me as 
plausible: Foucault links his critique of modern rationalization with the interrogation of the 
coercive structures that arise with sense-making itself (Foucault 1996, 389f).  On this view, the 
comprehensible is precisely what we should not take for granted. 
Nonetheless, for purposes of diagnosing the debate, my initial inclination is to begin by 
examining the differing practices of social critique we find in the two thinkers.  Here it helps to 
distinguish between the standpoint of the critical theorist of the public sphere and that of the 
participant in the public sphere. I begin with the theorist’s position, though we shall soon see that 
this standpoint is closely related to that of participants.  
Habermas and Foucault are both theorists providing us with two different approaches to 
critical analysis, which more or less map onto Foucault’s distinction between a formal or analytic 
method of critique—the search for “formal structures of universal value,” as we find in Kant--
and his own historical ontology of the present, which by the way Foucault also finds in Kant 
(Foucault 1984, 46; cf. 1994).  As critical theorists, however, Foucault and Habermas must 
confront the problematic issue of the position and status of the critical theorist: at least since Karl 
Marx, critical theorists have generally attempted to account for the grounds and possibility of 
their critique, and they have gotten into trouble precisely when they fail at this task.  Foucault in 
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particular has been criticized by a number of social theorists for failing to articulate the 
normative standpoint for his critique (e.g., McCarthy 1994).  Whether this criticism is fair to 
Foucault or not (cf. Schmidt and Wartenberg 1994), it illuminates what Habermas is up to when 
he attends to the normative bases of critique: he hopes thereby to discharge this burden on the 
critical theorist.  His attempts to formulate such idealizations as the “ideal speech situation” or 
the “unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation in general” lie at the heart of his 
efforts to ground, and explain the possibility of, his own standpoint as critical theorist.  For such 
idealizations undergird or explain the idea of a reasonable or undistorted public sphere, one in 
which communication and discourse are carried out in such a way as to provide the resources for 
a genuinely legitimate democratic politics.  Consequently, criticisms of public unreason are 
possible from the perspective of—they can appeal to--such idealizations, though these do not 
provide unshakeable foundations for critique (here Habermas disagrees with Karl-Otto Apel; 
Habermas 1990, 80-86, 95f). 
Herein lies a key difference between Foucault and Habermas.  Foucault is suspicious of just 
such claims about universal structures of public reason.  As Phillips construes the issue, 
Habermas’s appeal to formal idealizations seem to suggest the idea of a public sphere that could 
actually be reasonable, thus an actually “enlightened age.”  Indeed, Foucault seems to have read 
Habermas as proposing a kind of utopia of “perfectly transparent communication” (see 
McCarthy 1994, 265).  But Habermas does not intend such a reading, and to avoid it he has 
dropped his earlier term “ideal speech situation” (see Habermas 1999, 288f).  His formal 
idealizations are, rather, an attempt to spell out what we mean by “reasonable” public discussion 
as an ongoing process.  As idealizations, however, these do not, and could not, describe any 
empirically achievable public discussion.  Thus for Habermas, too, the public sphere can at most 
reflect the process of enlightenment, not its achievement. 
That said, Foucault’s suspicions still have a valid point—indeed they warn against an all-
too-easy familiarity with the meaning of “reasonable.”  But in the context of a Foucault-
Habermas debate, it is important to see exactly how such suspicions properly come into play.  
Although Habermas does not consider discursive idealizations to be fully realizable, he also 
holds that actual discussions can sometimes “approximate” the kind of reasonableness spelled 
out in these idealizations (Habermas 1993, 48-54; 1999, 296f).  More precisely: a well-conducted 
actual discourse can, at its best, warrant a provisional presumption that we’ve sufficiently 
approximated a reasonable discussion.  Just as we can take a chalk circle as a sufficiently good 
approximation of an ideal circle, so we can gain the sense that our discussion has indeed been 
reasonable, so far as we can tell, even though full reasonability is an unachievable idealization 
(cf. Habermas, 1993, 54f).   
Just this situation, however, poses the danger to which Foucault was so keenly attuned: a 
public that takes itself to be reasonable enough for present purposes (i.e., approximately 
reasonable), and thus takes itself to sufficiently comprehend its internal structures as legitimate 
and legitimating—thus to take itself as “enlightened”—though it in fact is still on the way to 
enlightenment.  Precisely because normative idealizations cannot be realized as such, even the 
best of public discussions contains elements of the ad hoc and contingent.  That is, we cannot, 
strictly speaking, treat each participant symmetrically, we cannot give equal attention to each 
person’s arguments, we cannot weigh arguments in an utterly bias-free manner.  Nor can any 
formal institutional procedure ensure that we do, for such procedures must always be applied in 
the face of circumstantial contingencies that can never be fully anticipated in advance.  
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Consequently, it is precisely in those situations in which a public congratulates itself on its 
reasonableness, precisely when a group comprehends its discussion as sufficiently approximating 
norms of public reason, that Foucault’s critical question makes the most sense: “in what is given 
to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, 
contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?” (Foucault 1984, 45).  
Notice that, having begun with the theorist’s position, we now find ourselves dealing with 
the standpoint of engaged participants in the public sphere, who strive to meet the norms of 
public reason articulated by the theorist.  The two positions are in fact closely related: after all, 
Habermas’s normative-theoretical analysis of the public sphere attempts to articulate the 
normative ideas that guide participants in actual discussions.  The dangerous presumption that I 
have just described--that is, the danger of a public of participants taking their discussions as 
reasonable and forgetting the mix of contingencies and biases that still remain—has in effect 
been licensed by the normative theory.  I say “in effect” because Habermas can of course protest 
that the very notion of an idealization should alert us to the fact that shortcomings always inhabit 
our most attentive and well-conducted discussions.  But perhaps we need more than such 
cautionary provisos, both at the theoretical and participant levels.  If so, then Foucault might 
provide the kind of theoretical corrective, which points in turn to the sorts of practical 
experiments in transgression he called for among participants. 
In light of the foregoing analysis, Phillips’ remarks on rhetoric as the area in which we 
might mediate the opposition between Foucault and Habermas seems on target. Certainly 
comprehensibility plays some role in this task, and if we examine the kind of rhetorical theory 
that might help us address the opposition between Foucault and Habermas, we can pinpoint this 
role.  To close then, I make a brief suggestion of the focus such a rhetorical analysis must take.   
Although, as Phillips notes, neither thinker has embraced rhetoric, attempts have been made 
to elaborate a rhetoric that would be compatible with each thinker’s critical philosophy  
(McKerrow 1989; Rehg 1997; Bohman 1988; 1997).  Rather than dig into these different 
proposals I will merely suggest that, if our concern is with the critique of the public sphere and 
democratic politics, then rhetorical analysis informed by both Foucault and Habermas must look 
above all to the diverse ways in which rhetoric affects the participants’ shared sense of closure of 
discussion.  That is, the rhetorical analysis should examine, on the one hand, the various devices 
speakers employ to assure their audiences that a given topic has been sufficiently discussed for 
us all to agree that the speaker’s solution is in fact the “reasonable” one, the solution that has 
gained “the consensus” of anyone who counts as “competent.”  Such constructions of consensus 
typically go hand-in-hand with the dismissal of remaining objections as unreasonable and 
uninformed.  On the other hand, rhetorical analysis should also attend to the ways in which 
opponents attempt to keep an issue open, or to open up for discussion a topic that has previously 
been off the agenda—in a word, the rhetorics of social-political criticism.   
Here I think that the notion of comprehensibility does play a key role, though not the only 
role.  We would expect speakers who aim at closure (even if this closure is only provisional, for 
a particular point in time and in view of a pressure to decide a political question) to emphasize 
the clarity of the matter and the arguments in favor of the preferred solution.  Moreover, we 
would expect them to invoke the hallmarks of rational discussion as unproblematic ideals that 
have been more or less satisfied.  Such speakers might claim, for example, that the discussion 
has been “open” and “unrestricted,” that every point of view has been given an “equal” and 
“impartial” hearing, and so on—as though these ideals and their application were readily 
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comprehensible.  Conversely, it is just such assumptions of comprehensibility and fulfillment 
that the rhetorics of criticism would aim to upset. However, I am not sure that comprehensibility 
should form the main or sole focus of such analysis.  Other devices are also available on both 
sides of such a discourse of closure and its contestation: for example, the Aristotelian means of 
persuasion could, I suspect, be employed both to hasten closure and to impede it.   
At the end of the day, however, it remains unclear, at least to me, whether Foucault’s 
approach has the resources to address the further question that such rhetorical analyses seem to 
leave answered: at the point of political choice, how do participants (or decision makers) sort 
through the opposing rhetorics of closure and criticism and determine which side has the better 
arguments?  To answer this question, it seems to me, we cannot do without a more robust 
normative analysis of the sort that Habermas hopes to provide. 
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